
Warangkana KORKIETPITAK

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I. Introduction

Japanese ODA dates back to the period of war reparation, which started in 1954 under the agreement of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. In the end of the 1980s, Japan took the place of the United States as the world’s largest donor country. After the Cold War’s demise, Japan’s record in Official Development Assistance (based on net expenditure) was at the top in the world for 10 consecutive years from 1991 through 2000. Despite its tremendous amount of aid to developing countries, Japanese ODA was criticized for only aiming at its own economics interest. However, after the end of the Cold War, globalization has brought about numerous problems, such as drugs, inequality, terrorism, and so on, which affect directly individuals’ lives or human well being. The globalization has forced international community to get concerned with those problems. Then, the paradigm of international development assistance shifted in a big scale in the 1990s when the World Summit for Social Development called for social development assistance; instead of economy oriented assistance. Since then Japan’s ODA has a new direction emphasizing assistance related to human-centered social development, so emergence of the concept of human security seems to be the cornerstone of Japan’s foreign aid in pursuit of economic and social development.

However, what is “human security”? The development of human security concept emerged through two different streams – Theoretical contributions from a group of scholars including Mahbub UI Haq and Amartya Sen and institutional efforts from United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and Canadian government. First of all, it is necessary to explain the role of all these elements in conceptualizing human security. Beginning with the term of "human security, it could be considered as a concept for future vision and agenda for action and was first mentioned in the 1994 UNDP’s Human Development Report. This idea was closely associated with the human security concept initiated by Mahbub UI Haq, former Pakistan Finance Minister and consultant of UNDP. His paper, New Imperatives of Human Security published
in 1994 gives theoretical explanation of human security and five radical steps to achieve human security. According to Haq human security underlines security of individuals and not just only security of nation state. He identifies a human development conception with emphasis on equity, sustainability, and grassroots participation as one of the five steps to achieve human security. Haq’s initiative was welcomed by international community and was influential in the forming of a new concept of UNDP. In the same year, UNDP publishes Human Development Report which contained a separate section on human security title Redefining Security: The Human Dimension. The report referred to Haq’s concept which was based on security of people. The report also gives a proper definition of security for the first time in its inception – freedom from fear and freedom from want giving equal weight to territories and to people (UNDP, 1994: 229). Also, the report points out the components of human security including: economic security, food security, health security, environment security, personal security, community security, and political security (UNDP, 1994: 230). Thus UNDP perceive a broad concept of human security but some academic writings works amount to restatements or revisions of the UNDP’s laundry list of human security issues (Roland, 2001: 91). For example, Jorge Nef mentions a fivefold classification scheme is a component of human security as follows; 1) environment, personal, and physical security, 2) economic security, 3) social security, 4) political security, and 5) cultural security (Nef, 1999, 25). While Laura Reed and Majid Tehranian proposes ten constituent elements such as psychological security, communication security and so on (Reed and Tehranian, 1999, 39, 47).

Despite the continuing debate over the definition and different emphases, human security has been enunciated by many countries, in particular Canada and Japan. As for Canada, it has promoted a more restrictive definition of human security as “freedom from pervasive threats to people’s right, safety or lives (Canadian Foreign Ministry). The Canadian perspective of human security also presents a number of threats and stresses the measures to deal with the serious concerns by focusing on peace building, peace keeping, equal trade, and economic development. In contrast, the Japanese government has advocated an approach to human security closely related to the 1994 formulation of UNDP, thereby embracing a broad definition of both freedom from fear (such as from conflicts and terrorism, natural disasters, and environmental degradation, infectious diseases, and economic crises etc.) and freedom from want (such as that resulting from poverty, malnutrition, lack of education, health and other social services, underdevelopment of the basic infrastructure etc.). Moreover, Japan has been carrying out the concept in accordance with the vision of the Commission on Human Security (CHS), co-chaired by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen. The Commission on Human Security published the final report titled Human Security Now in 2003. The final report well defines human security as “to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedom and human fulfillment” (The Final Report, Section 1-2 of Chapter 1). The final report summarizes the main point of the relationship between human development and human security as follows: ‘Human development is an optimistic concept since it emphasizes expanding opportunities for people to ensure that progress is fair, i.e., growth with equity.” Human security” complements human development by deliberately focusing on “downside risk.”

Thus, the Japanese definition of human security is mainly equivalent to human development which is one of the key notions in operating ODA. Nevertheless, human security became a new way to define its overseas development assistance policy. As we can see that a human security perspective was included as one of its five basic policies when renewing its ODA charter in 2003. Moreover, human security was included in the 2005 Medium-Term Policy on ODA as an effective approach to development assistance. Human security is introduced in the declaratory side but we have not many researches on implementation side nevertheless. It is not clear how policy change influences on Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)’s technical cooperation, which endeavors to promote human resource development.

However, the primary objectives of this study are to deepen understanding of Japanese foreign aid policies on human security from its starting point and Japan’s driving forces for promotion of human security behind its foreign aid policies.
Also, the study aims to investigate the direction of Japanese ODA and JICA’s activities for human security. As for Japan’s foreign aid policies on human security, the scope for this study and the evidence collection will focus on the time span from the end of 1990s to the early 2000s. The period from the end of 1990s to the early 2000s is chosen, through empirical observation, on the ground that Japan, in particular Prime Ministers, played a proactive role in the international arena in that period. In 2000s, Japanese ODA has changed obviously and then, JICA was reformed in 2003 and in 2008, becoming ‘New JICA’ which is the world’s largest bilateral development organization. Therefore, this period should be useful to study what drove Japan to promote human security and how Japanese ODA and JICA were used for supporting the policies.

Therefore, in this paper I trace the evolution of Japan’s foreign aid policy in order to point out how Japan utilized aid as diplomatic tool for its own economic interest. Then, I explore the background to the adoption of the concept of human security in Japan’s foreign policy. I also attempt to investigate its driving forces of promoting human security behind Japanese foreign aid policies up to 2003 which can be seen as marking the end of the introductory phase of Japan’s pursuit of human security. Besides, I explore the direction of Japanese ODA Policy on human security and examine JICA’s direction regarding its mission and principles which give us a clue in the search for its practice. In this part, I also raised a case study of the Map Ta Phut Industrial Estate, Rayong Province in Thailand, where Japanese ODA has been allocate since 1989s. Then, we can learn from this case how Japanese aid target has shifted. Lastly, the paper concludes with some observations of driving forces behind Japan’s foreign aid policies and Japan’s role in promoting human security issues in the future.

II. The Evolution of Japanese Foreign Aid Policy on the Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the 1950s to the early 2000s

Japan has provided ODA to developing countries for more than half a century and used ODA to function as a key instrument of its foreign policy. The beginning of Japanese ODA dates back to the period of war reparation starting from 1954 in the context of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The reparation payments were focused on Southeast Asian countries; countries considered as a source for new materials in the postwar period, in the forms of “economic cooperation.” With economic relations with Southeast Asia, Japan used aid for an explicit tool to promote trade and export so that the grant element in Japanese were low and all aid was linked to the purchase of Japanese goods and services. Thus, the policy of trade promotion through tying aid began in 1958, when Japan extended its first yen loan to India (Grant, 1998: 46). In 1961, it was an important time for Japan to be part of international community when Japan formally joined the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as a founding member. Japanese aid was diversified and enriched in quality: food aid started in 1968, and general grants were disbursed in 1969.

Through the 1970s, Japanese ODA still emphasized on Asia, in particular with key Asian neighbors, for strengthening relations. More than half of ODA allocation went to the economic-infrastructure sector and the production sector. However, after the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) placed an oil embargo on the American allies including Japan, Japan firstly used aid as a diplomatic weapon because of its concern about the stability of natural resources supply. As a result, Ministry of Foreign Affair (MOFA) and Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) officials could effectively join forces on aid issues to press Ministry of Finance to release the budget for key energy-producing countries and even nations bordering important natural resource routes (Orr, 1990: 55).

By the end of 1970s Japan recognized itself as a country poor in natural resources, so the flows of aid went to emerging Asian countries to obtain sources of raw materials. Nevertheless, one motivation of giving aid in this period was to improve Japan’s image in Asia because it was the way to be respected by the international community. Japan started the so called gift-giving diplomacy (Omiyage Gaiko) which since then has been extensively used by Japanese Prime Ministerstouring in
Asia (Söderberg, 1996: 35). During the 1980s, Japanese aid policy had two broad goals: to share the burden by contributing toward the security of the Western alliance in response to greater demands by the DAC expecting Japan to extend more grants oriented toward basic human needs and to support the “comprehensive national security” policy (by maintaining reliable and affordable supplies of raw materials and foodstuffs from foreign suppliers and unimpeded access to foreign markets for Japanese exports and investment) (Grant, 1998: 46). Moreover, encouraged by the United States toward more burden sharing of maintaining world peace and the international economic order, Japan allocated aid to U.S. allies such as Pakistan and Egypt, as well as to Latin America, where Japan did not necessarily have its own strong interests (Katada, 2005: 6). As a result of this pressure, aid flows increased rapidly under explicit funding targets and “aid doubling” schedules established by the Japanese government in the 1980s.

In the end of the 1980s, Japan took the place of the United States, becoming the world’s largest donor country because of the yen appreciation after the 1985 Plaza Accord affected the ODA disbursement. Japan provided Asia with about half of Japanese ODA. It was argued that Japanese ODA facilitated the region’s tremendous rise and brought about “The East Asian miracle” that gave Japanese businessmen and policy-makers pride in Japan’s own economic development experience. On the other hand, Japan was criticized as a “nurturing mercantilist” because it had managed to provide a solid economic base for many development countries, particularly in Southeast Asia, by concentrating on physical infrastructure in order to attract private direct investment from Japan and elsewhere for industrializing and increasing exports. Besides, in 1980s, Japanese ODA had been criticized for lack of “philosophy” by the international aid community. In addition, it was blamed for its economically-oriented ODA and its poor capacity for implementing aid (Sawamura, 2004: 27-28). That is because its implementation system is somewhat neglected (Shimomura, 1999: 63-64), so the impact and effectiveness of Japanese ODA in developing countries were not clearly seen. In response to domestic criticism and international pressure, the Japanese government enacted the ODA Charter in order to clarify and validate the objectives of providing ODA (Sawamura, 2004: 29). After that, Cabinet endorsed the ODA Policy which was a foundation of Japan’s aid policy in 1992. Japan announced guidelines and principles for aid giving by introducing a formal Foreign Aid Charter. The four principles set forth in the charter are “(1) pursuing environmental conservation and development simultaneously; (2) avoiding the use of aid for military purposes or for the aggravation of military conflicts; (3) monitoring trends in recipient countries’ military expenditures, development and production of weapons of mass destruction, and export and import of arms; (4) promoting democratization and introduction of market economies, and attending to the conditions related to basic human rights and freedom” (MOFA, 1992: 45). As for the forth principle, it shows that Japan started taking into consideration human’s freedom, though it was not clear what issues were related to this issue.

In this 1990s period, Japanese ODA was improved in terms of its quality and characteristics but more aid was still directed toward social infrastructure and service in 1993 (Trinidad, 2007: 96). This increase reflected the goals of Japanese aid explained by “The securing of world peace and stability, the furtherance of global economic prosperity, the promotion of universal values such as freedom, human rights and democracy and the solution of global issues such as environmental problems” (MOFA, 1993: 3). However, while the Japanese government had kept its decade-long status as the largest aid donor since 1989, the domestic environment for foreign aid in the Japan became worse because of the collapse of the bubble economy in the early 1990s. In addition, Japan had become ageing society, putting pressures on the health system and social security. The public, which had approved foreign aid as a means to contribute to the international community, began to criticize it as wasteful and ineffective (Katada, 2005: 6). As a result, total aid disbursement was sharply reduced in 1996. Meanwhile, aid-implementing ministries were increasingly under pressure to be leaner, more transparent and more effective. Thus, foreign aid policy which had been a key diplomatic tool was revised and Japan’s leaders had to rethink about how foreign aid policy should be utilized for national interest and for international contribution.
Ⅲ. The Rise of Human Security in Japanese Foreign Aid Policy

Ⅲ.1. The Role of Japan’s Prime Ministers in Paving the Way for Human Security

Japanese aid foreign policy on human security was not initiated by Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) but it was introduced with strong leadership by Japan’s Prime Ministers. Japan’s involvement in human security started with the introduction by Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi when he gave a speech on the occasion of the UN World Summit for Social Development held in March 1995. In his speech, Murayama stated that:

“as head of the Japanese government, I seek the creation of a ‘human-centered society,’ a vision of Japan in which each individual citizen is treated equally, endowed with opportunity of fully develop his or her potential, and enabled to utilize fully his or her capacity through employment and participation in society”. Japan gives priority to human-centered social development (UN, 1995).

However, Murayama’s support remained at a discursive level and did not make any changes in Japanese aid foreign policy. It was Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo who brought up the concept of human security to the mainstream of Japanese foreign aid policy. Obuchi explained his personal interest in human security as stemming from his student days when he traveled by himself “to 38 countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, North America and Latin America as a backpacker, something that was exceedingly unusual at the time. This solitary journey taught me the importance of the links between people, and of people as individuals. Ultimately, I believe, it gave me an appreciation of human security.”

According to JCIE President Yamamoto Tadashi Yamamoto, one of Obuchi associates, he pointed out there were two reasons related to the origin of human security in Japan’s foreign policy. He testified to the crucial role of Obuchi: ‘One reason human security was incorporated into the Japanese government’s policy system had to do with Obuchi’s own character. The concept of human security was already spreading, but if someone else had been prime minister things might not have progressed.’ One more reason is that Obuchi had been backed by brain trust who worked on the concept of human security. This brain trust was made up of private citizens – people like Yoichi Funabashi, columnist and chief diplomatic correspondent for the Asahi Shimbun newspaper; Akira Kojima, managing director and editor in chief of the Nihon Keizai Shimbun newspaper; Makoto Iokibe, a professor at Kobe University; and Akihiko Tanaka, a professor at the University of Tokyo. Takemi Keizo, the state-secretary at that time, brought up the idea of human security since he had been assigned the task of coming up with policy proposals when Obuchi was appointed foreign minister in Hashimoto Ryutaro’s second cabinet. When human security was presented to the minister by this group, Obuchi took it as his baby, since the concept was consonant with his idea. When he became prime minister, he directly linked this effort to ban anti-personnel landmines with human security. He decided to sign the Ottawa convention to ban anti-personnel landmines as a measure to promote human security despite strong opposition from MOFA and the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) who were concerned about the strategic value of anti-personnel landmines from the perspective of the Japan-US Security Treaty and the threat of an invasion of Japan by North Korea (Fukushima, 137). Obuchi made a policy change in Japan’s policy on landmines which demonstrate his leadership capability. It can be said that the quest of human security was started with Obuchi’s personal endeavor. Then, he exerted his leadership to instructed MOFA to work on promoting human security concept.

After that, he delivered two speeches at the end of 1998 using the word of “human security” (ningen no anzenhosho) instead of “human safety”. The first speech was delivered at the Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow. Obuchi stated his understanding of the idea of human security “comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life and dignity of human beings and strengthens the efforts to confront those threats (JCIE, 1998). Another one was the speech entitled “Toward the Creation of a Bright Future for Asia” delivered on the occasion of the Summit Meeting of ASEAN Plus Three (APT). Obuchi announced that Asia needed to emphasize human security “to implement measures for
the socially vulnerable who have been affected by the Asian economic crisis. With regard to Obuchi’s speeches, these two speeches can be considered as the foundation on which Japan’s approach to human security was later developed (Fukushima, 2005: 16).

The 1999 Diplomatic Bluebook specifically raised globalization and the 1997 Asian financial crisis as the main reasons that human security was required. Also, the 1999 Bluebook refers to the role of Obuchi in positioning human security in Japan’s foreign policy. However, at the Millennium Summit, Japan’s Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, Obuchi’s successor, announced Japan’s intention to play a major role in promoting “human-centered” approach by establishing an international committee on human security, which later become the Commission on Human Security (CHS). In his policy speech to the 151st Session of the Diet, Mori explicitly positioned human security as the guiding principle of Japanese foreign policy as follow:

I have cited “human security” as the guiding principle for Japan’s diplomacy in leading international cooperation activities. The goal of human security is to guarantee the security, safety and dignity of each individual living on Earth (Kantei, 2001).

Since 2000, the Bluebook enumerated human security as ‘a key perspective’ in developing the country’s foreign policy. The shift from ‘pillar’ to ‘key perspective’ may reflect the internal argument that human security itself is not a substantive content to advance. But instead acts as a framework to bundle together new security issues (Fukushima, 2003: 153). In the 2002 Diplomatic Bluebook, annual white paper of Japanese foreign policy, states that:

Endorsing human security as the cornerstone of international cooperation in the 21st century, Japan is striving to make the new century a human-centered one—Japan is demonstrating international leadership in the promotion of human security by institutionalizing a series of concrete measures and providing human security as a key perspective in the development of Japan’s foreign policy (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2002: 89).

In April 2001, after Mori stepped down, Koizumi Junichiro took the position as Prime Minister. Koizumi’s priority was structural reform, in particular economic reform and strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance in response to 9/11 terrorist attacks. In his general policy speech to the Diet in January 2003, Koizumi referred to efforts to improve the efficiency and transparency of ODA and stated that ODA should be “extended strategically, with a priority on “human security”, including such areas stability and growth in Asia, post-conflict consolidation of peace, and the environment” (MOFA, 2003). His speech made it clear that human security was given more emphasis on Japan’s ODA policy rather than in general foreign policy. Thus, the presence of human security in Japanese diplomacy decreased, and then human security was given emphasis in Japan’s ODA policy instead.

Ⅲ 2. Driving Forces of the Promotion of Human Security behind Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy

The explanations for Japan to promote human security as a pillar of its foreign policy are found in a combination of three factors: an aspiration to become leadership, the quest for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Seat, and image enhancement of Japanese ODA. These factors overlap and relate to each other at the same time.

Firstly, the 1997 financial crisis in Asia gave impetus for adoption of “human security” as a pillar of its foreign policy (Yamamoto, 2003: 4; Edström, 2008: 88; Fukushima, 2003: 136). A UN special advisor on human security, Takasu Yukio who was a top official of MOFA stated: “the 1997 Asian financial crisis led to a major reduction in government spending on medical services and education across Asia, bringing about a situation under which people’s livelihoods were threatened. Keizo Obuchi, Japanese Prime Minister at the time, saw a situation as an important opportunity to take specific action to support socially vulnerable people focusing on human security (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2011: 18). From this perspective, it seems Japan had taken into considerations humanitarian reason for giving assistance. Nevertheless, it was not just humanitarian reason which drove Japan’s ambition into hard-working and earnest promoter of human security.
One was that Japan’s motivation for gaining leadership in Asia.

In this perspective, the Asian crisis further stimulated Japan to act as a leader since incompetence of IMF and US refusal to establish an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) at the time of crisis forced Japan to build alternative safety nets in cooperation with Asian neighbors (Ohno, 2002: 10). Meanwhile, Japan was called for to assume leadership by the crisis countries, such as Indonesia and Malaysia. On the occasion of international symposium ‘Health Initiative in Asian Economic Crisis: Human-Centered Approach’, hosted by the United Nations University in Tokyo on 27 April 1998, Obuchi brought up human security in his opening address for the first time. He stated that the importance of paying attention to social safety nets in international cooperation (MOFA, 1998). Therefore, the Asian Crisis boosted Obuchi to promote human security by providing bilateral assistance to the crisis countries. In October 1998, Finance Minister Miyazawa Kiichi presented a US$ 30 billion plan; the New Miyazawa Plan, to assist those countries.

On 2 December 1998 in Tokyo, Obuchi stressed that Japan had contributed to Asian countries to help them dealing with the crises, and had assisted, in the first place, the ‘socially vulnerable segments of population on whom economic difficulties have the heaviest impacts. Also, he indicated that Japanese ODA should be offered to promote social development, including public health, in order to enhance the “human safety” of these vulnerable individuals. This attention to health issues is said to have been influenced by then State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Keizo Takemi, the son of the late Taro Takemi, who was the former president of the Japanese Medical Association (Fukushima, 2003: 134-135). In this context, it could be said that Japan’s foreign aid policy was still driven by interest groups inside the government.

However, the Asian economic crisis gave an opportunity for Japan to play a key role as in international community. According to Edström: ‘Obuchi and his collaborators realized that Japan could become a leader in the sense of creating universally accepted values, if it adopted and preached the virtues of human security alongside its recognized role as the world’s largest aid donor, which role it had kept up throughout the 1990s despite its economic problems’ (Edström, 2008: 223). In 1998, Obuchi announced, in addition to his intention to promote bilateral assistance, that Japan would provide 500 million yen (4.2 million U.S. dollars) for the establishment of the Trust Fund for Human Security (TFHS) under the United Nations and as of August 2003, total contribution amounted to some 22.9 billion yen (200 million U.S. dollars), making the trust fund the largest of its kind established in the U.N. The TFHS was initially intended to be a tool for launching ODA projects in Asia. Besides, categories of projects implemented under Human Security Fund were poverty reduction projects, medical and health care, control of infectious diseases, refugee and internally displaced persons assistance and conflict-related areas. According to Yamamoto: “Rather, it was felt that human security represented an area where Japan could make the strongest contribution to the international community, as a major power that may be characterized as a ‘global civilian power’” (Yamamoto, 2003: 6). With an effort of Obuchi’s will, Japan’s promotion of human security was perceived by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. During a visit to Japan in 1999, Annan lauded Obuchi’s effort to promote human security: "By his extraordinary commitment to human security and his establishment of a Human Security Fund, Japan would undoubtedly have a lifetime seat if there were such a thing as a ‘human security council’ (Untied Nation, 1999). Annan’s opinion reflects how much Obuchi took action on the promotion on human security policies.

While Obuchi tried to boost regional cooperation for human security in Asian countries, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Mori, his successor, expanded Japan’s role in promoting human security concept in African countries. Mori was the first-ever Prime Minister to visit three African countries (the Republic of South Africa, the Republic of Kenya, and the Federal Republic of Nigeria). He realized that Africa was still confronted with issues such as poverty, conflict and infectious diseases so that after return to Japan he gave a policy speech to the 151st Session of the Diet on 31 January 2001 about Japan’s responsibilities and leadership on the establishment of human security in Africa. As he stated as follows:

“…Each of these issues facing Africa threatens the very existence of the human race. They made me feel strongly that we must establish a "human security that will release all people from such threats and forge a 21st century that
will shine brightly for the people of the world. Furthermore, I felt a renewed determination that Japan will exercise responsibility and leadership toward this end” (Cabinet Secretariat, Cabinet Public Relations Office, 2001).

Mori announced Japan’s contribution of more than U.S.$80 million and promised a further U.S.$ 100 million to the UN Trust Fund for Human Security established in March 1999. Soon after that, Annan visited Japan again but at this time he sought the cooperation of Japan, which had a track record of nonmilitary international cooperation in order to accomplish “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want (Ogata, 2011). Mori agreed to this request”. In 2001, the Commission on Human Security (CHS) was formally launched and was co-chaired by Ogata Sadako, former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and Amartya Sen, the first Asian to be awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics and Master of Trinity College, Cambridge. Japan is fully supporting the Commission in its activities, with the aim of achieving a concept and key language that intellectually define the basic situation in the international community at the beginning of the 21st century regarding human security. The pursuit of human security paved the way for Japan to step forward to take responsibility as a leadership. The establishment of the CHS and the TFHS enhanced Japan’s leadership in the context of international arena.

Secondly, the quest for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) seat is Japan’s driving force of the promotion of human security policies. Even though Japan has been elected as a non-permanent member of the Security Council at every alternate term, Japan’s inspiration for a permanent seat at the Security Council of the United Nations has been one of the most important goal of Japan’s diplomacy in the post Cold War period. As for Japan’s security, the constitutional restriction (Constitution Article 9) regarding the use of force and historical legacy restricted Japan’s participation in UN peace keeping operations (PKO). As a result, Japan has attempted to utilize ODA budget to promote international stability. From his own perspective, Obuchi told a journalist in September 1999, ‘we are abiding by the Japanese constitution, and thus we are forbidden to contribute to world peace by any military presence. We are trying hard to contribute world peace by pursuing human security – that is, to achieve security for human beings’ (Plate, 1999). In this context, Akiyama discussed that “If introduction of the concept of human security enlarges the scope of security-related activities into social and economic dimensions, as least raises the significance of activities in the social and economic development up to the level of conventional security issue, it would cover up the shortfall of Japan”. In a sense, if Japan succeeds in promoting human security at the international arena, it might help Japan acquire its candidacy for a permanent seat on UNSC. While one of Japan’s leading international law specialists, Yokota Yozo, argues along this line: “Since Japan’s restrictions in dealing with traditional security matters for constitution reasons, he says, the pursuit of human security seemed to open the prospects for Japan to play a larger role in international security”. He does not hesitate to claim that the aim behind Japan’s campaign for human security was its ambition to gain permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.

To gain a seat as a permanent representative on the UN Security Council, Japan needed enough votes of all UN members to support for Japan as one of the new members. That is why Japan tried to promote human security in Africans which had the largest bloc of votes in the organization. One senior Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Official speaking about the Prime Minister’s visit to Africa revealed: "Forging ties with Africa was not just for collecting votes at the United Nations" (cited in Seifudein, 2001). It is obvious that Africa’s potentially significant votes in the UN General Assembly in support of Japan’s permanent membership in a reformed Security Council had probably also been a factor in Prime Minister Mori’s decision to visit Africa (Seifudein, 2001).

Thirdly, one of the motivations behind Japan’s human security policies is image enhancement of Japanese ODA. That is because Japanese ODA was blamed for wastefulness and ineffectiveness since Japan faced economic recession and deficit fiscal situation in 1990s. As a result, Japan’s ODA has been steadily losing domestic support. According to a poll conducted by Japan’s Cabinet Office in 2003 (Cited in Kazuo, 2004: 4), the percentage of people having a positive attitude toward ODA dropped from 43.2% in 1990 to 19.0%, with those who favored a reduction in ODA increased from 10.7% to 25.5%.
Nevertheless, opinion surveys in Japan indicated that public support increases if the government emphasizes ODA’s humanitarian aspects. For this reason, this might be one of driving forces of the enhancement of human security. The trust fund is allocated for activities related to poverty reduction, refugee problems, education, infectious diseases, crime, and natural disasters etc. Moreover, TFHS, initiated by Obuchi, enlarges its geographical scope to finance activities all over the world. Its budget was based almost entirely on Japanese financial sources that have amounted by March 2006 to about $279 million. In this context, the human security policies initiated by Obuchi can be interpreted as an attempt to launch an assault on Japan’s image as a ‘faceless’ economic giant without concerns other than how it fared economically (Edström, 2008: 268).

Furthermore, Japan’s foreign policy was criticized as “chequebook diplomacy” because Japan only contributed a huge amount of money instead of the dispatch of self defense forces during the Gulf War. In response to an international security crisis, Japan adopted a law on international peace cooperation that permitted the government to dispatch self-defense forces for UN operation. In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi referred to “human security” in his speech to the International Symposium on Human Security hosted by MOFA. Koizumi focused on Japan’s role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, linking the eradication of terrorism with the necessity to deal with ‘other diverse threats to individuals’ because armed conflicts, poverty and other socioeconomic factors create “hotbeds” for terrorism (Cited in Atanassova-Cornelis, 2006: 45). In this respect, it could be said that the concept of human security gave Japan the opportunity of transforming its role into international security provider who plays a more proactive international role. Huliaras and Tzifakis argued: “To comprehend the importance of this change in Japan’s imaging, it suffices to recall the aspiration of the country to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, which implied a weighted responsibility in the promotion of global security” (Huliaras and Tzifakis, 2007: 565).

IV. The Vehicles for Promoting Human Security: ODA Policy and Japan International Cooperation Agency

IV.1. The Official Development Assistance (ODA) Policy and Human Security

The new sign showing that Japanese ODA had shifted its concerns from economic development was Obuchi’s intention to enhance cooperation in the field of health and employment as “human security” concerns. In other words, the shift of Japanese ODA put priority on human-centered social development. In addition, the use of the ODA budget for human security purposes was introduced with Japan’s Medium-Term Policy on Official Development Assistance (ODA) issued by MOFA in August 1999.

Nevertheless, it was only from 2003 that human security came to occupy a substantial place in Japan’s ODA policy. As the driving force for placing human security in the global arena, Japan naturally embraced the CHS findings and overhauled its policies by revising the Official Development Assistance Charter (MOFA, 2003). Hence, the 2003 ODA Charter positioned human security as one of five basic policies as follows:

In order to address direct threats to individuals such as conflicts, disasters, infectious diseases, it is important not only to consider the global, regional, and national perspectives, but also to consider the perspective of human security, which focuses on individuals. Accordingly, Japan will implement ODA to strengthen the capacity of local communities through human resource development. To ensure that human dignity is maintained at all stages, from the conflict stage to the reconstruction and development stages, Japan will extend assistance for the protection and empowerment of individuals (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 2003).

As for priority area, Japan prioritized its assistance for Asia, particularly to South East Asian countries, which Japan has
close relationship to Japan and can have a major impact on Japan’s stability and prosperity in order to enhance strong economic relations with the region. However, Africa has also continued to be an important recipient of Japan’s ODA, with Japan providing aid through the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process, and by way of extending grant aid in the areas of health and medical care, education, water and food. Aid was no longer regarded as an instrument for directly promoting Japan’s commercial interests. Rather, it was viewed as a contribution to the peace and development of the international community on which Japan’s own security and prosperity depend. (Trinidad 2007: 106)

Moreover, the 2003 charter specifically refers to transnational issues such as poverty reduction, sustainable growth, HIV/AIDS, and peace-building. In order to make a concept to an action, Japan has used the Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects which put priority on basic human needs (BHNs). Also, in the introduction, it points out that Japan’s purpose in contributing ODA was to enhance its image in the international level. In addition, it could be said that Japan still anticipated achieving its own economic interests for national prosperity and stability – its own economic security. In the 2002 ODA white paper, the report emphasizes that the main criterion for ODA allocation is its use as a tool to promote Japan’s national interests and its own security and prosperity (MOFA, 2002). In the introduction to this report, MOFA reiterated the fundamental position of Japan’s ODA policy:

As the world’s second largest economic and the largest donor of official development assistance (ODA), Japan shoulders the important responsibility of contribution to sustainable social and economic development in developing countries. This is a role through which Japan can win the confidence and appreciation of the international community. Furthermore, as a nation whose prosperity is closely linked to world peace and stability and that is highly dependent on the importation of resources, energy, food and other basic materials, ODA plays a very significant role in ensuring Japan’s own stability and prosperity. As such, economic assistance promotes Japan’s best interests, including the maintenance of peace.

In 2005, the Medium-Term Policy on Official Development Assistance (New Medium-Term ODA Policy) still highlighted human security as a core philosophy of substantive aid and states that it is “a perspective that should be reflected in all of development assistance. In addition to the definition of human security, in the New Medium-Term ODA Policy, human security was defined as "focusing on individual people and building societies in which everyone can live with dignity by protecting and empowering individuals and communities that are exposed to actual or potential threats."

After setting the above framework in place, human security concept has been implemented through three main drivers: the Grant Assistance for Grassroots and Human Security Projects (GGP) administered by the Japanese embassies in recipient countries; JICA and at the UN level, the TFHS. The MOFA reformed a category of “Grassroots grants,” which provides small grant aids to projects conducted by non-governmental organization for community reconstruction or capacity building, health and so on.

IV.2. JICA’s Direction for Human Security

In response to foreign aid policy on human security, JICA initiated the “JICA Grassroots Partnership Program with NGOs, Local Governments and Institutes” 21. In fiscal 1999, in order to develop more meticulous and swift cooperation, the program is concentrated on the provision of cooperation in areas of social development. JICA is implementing the program on the basis of tie-ups with Japanese NGOs and local governments that possess practical expertise in these areas. In the aftermath of the reform of Japan’s ODA in 2003, JICA was reorganized as a new type of entity called the “Independent Administrative Institutions” (IAIS). The legal framework for IAIs was established to transform public agencies into more autonomous institutions. This greater autonomy is expected to give JICA renewed incentives and creativity in their work on technical cooperation and grant assistance. At the same time, Ogata Sadako was appointed president of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) on October, 1 2003. Ogata was widely expected not only to appeal to the
domestic and international audiences but also to support the implementation of the new human security flavored ODA policies (Yamasaki, 2009: 151). After the reform of Japan’s ODA policy and JICA, Ogata declared that Japan would strive to make the 21st century a “human-centered” century.

One year later, the “First Phase of JICA’s Reform Plan,” announced in March 2004, lists Human Security as one of the three elements of JICA’s reform. Three main factors contributed to JICA’s incorporation of Human Security. Firstly, the realization that the diversity of issues affecting people requires an understanding of their complexity and a comprehensive approach to dealing with them; secondly, the increased need for a framework that linked development and peace; and thirdly, the awareness that peace and development for the international society as a whole cannot be achieved without addressing the needs of regions and countries in difficult circumstances.

Furthermore, JICA’s practice in the field of human security is based on these four kinds of cooperation as follows; 1) cooperation that comprehensively targets freedom from fear (conflicts and disasters) and want (poverty); 2) cooperation that involve thorough consideration for the socially vulnerable, emphasizing benefits from them; 3) cooperation that establishes mechanisms to protect and empower people; and 4) cooperation that addresses global risks. Based on the implementation, JICA seeks more close cooperation not only from the governmental agencies, but also from international organizations and NGOs. In order to empower communities and individuals, JICA expands its cooperation at the local level. This reflects the way of JICA’s operation which is based on the bottom-up approach.

Besides, JICA abide by seven principles to achieve human security. These are primarily: assisting the needy using a people-centered approach; protection and empowerment of persons; prioritizing the most vulnerable individuals and groups; enabling freedom from want and fear; responding better to comprehensive threats using inter-sectoral techniques; working with the government and local sectors to bring about sustainable development; and partnering various actors to maximize efficacy of ODA (Ogata, 2007). Based on these principles, it seems that JICA makes a balance of freedom from fear and from want and put more emphasis on various groups of partnership.

Five years later, New JICA was established for the second time in October 2008. It merged with the overseas economic cooperation section of the Japan Bank for International Co-operation (JBIC), which managed Japan’s ODA loans, while took responsibilities for some grants previously managed by MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Consequently, JICA has become the world’s biggest bilateral aid agency with a size of estimated $10.3 billion dollars. It is considered as the “one stop shop of Japan’s ODA”. On this occasion, New JICA announced an all-new Vision which has been divided into four missions. With regard to human security, it was placed as the forth mission;

Achieving human security

The advance of globalization causes an increase in various cross-border dangers and exposes many people in developing countries to civil strife, disasters, poverty, and other humanitarian threats. The concept of human security places individual human beings at its core, seeking to defend them from fear and want: fear of things like conflict, terrorism, disaster, environmental destruction, and infectious disease, and want in the face of poverty and in social services and infrastructure. By building up people’s abilities to address these issues themselves, this approach aims to build societies in which they can live with dignity. In order to defend the weakest members of society from these various threats, New JICA will support efforts to bolster social and institutional capacity and to increase people’s ability to deal with threats themselves.

As mentioned above, JICA has substantively interpreted human security in terms of various and broad meanings. From JICA’s perspective, human security cover transnational problems related to economy, education, healthcare, environment and life safety. Hence, its projects could be implemented more flexibility and easier to engage with various groups of partnership. Meanwhile, JICA needs to foster wider recognition and support to its efforts at the social level and individual level.
As for JICA’s activities, we need to examine how JICA utilized expenditure in order to achieve its mission. Thus, the budget allocation by sector shows us implementation through JICA.

IV.2.1. Composition of Activities by Sector

Looking at costs by sector in connection with technical cooperation implemented by JICA between 1999 and 2009. As for budget allocation, planning and administration, public works and utilities, agriculture, forestry and fisheries, human resources, health and medical care, and mining have dropped since 1999 but public works and utilities and agriculture,
forestry and fisheries have been rising from 2008. While energy, business and trade, and welfare have been constant since 1999. Surprisingly, others have been increasing dramatically since 1999.

As for JICA’s percentage of technical cooperation by sector, the figure shows that planning and administration increased from 1999 to 2003 but since 2004 it has dropped until now. Public works and utilities increased in 2000 but decreased from 2001 to 2008, except in 2005 and in 2009. While, agriculture, forestry and fisheries, human resources, and health and medical care have been decreasing gradually. In contrast, mining and industry have dropped significantly since 2001. Moreover, energy, business and trade, and welfare have been constant for 10 years. However, others have been increasing dramatically since 2002 and nearly reached 35% in 2009.

As mentioned above, the expenditure of technical cooperation or percentage of Technical Cooperation by sector could not reflect that JICA concentrated more social sector, such as health and medical care, welfare regarding human security. However, the empirical research is found that JICA has shifted its direction for providing in the case of Map Ta Phut Industrial Estate, Rayong Province, Thailand. The following part examines how JICA shifts it activities from economic cooperation to environmental cooperation.

### IV.2.2. A Case Study of Map Ta Phut Industrial Estate, Rayong Province, Thailand

Rayong is one of three eastern provinces which were designated to operate the Eastern Seaboard Program. Map Ta Phut Industrial Estate was established in 1988 in Rayong as part of this program to be the core of heavy industries. Since then, Japan supported the Easter Seaboard program through JBIC (Japan Bank for International Cooperation). JBIC provided 178,768 million yen, which accounted for approximately ten percent of the sum of ODA loans for the Eastern Seaboard Development Plan, by the end of fiscal year 1998 (end of March 1999), that amounts to, 1,631,196 million yen. Up to now twenty seven ODA loans were given to sixteen projects for construction of infrastructures such as port construction, electricity generation, transmission of electricity, roads and highways etc. in the region. In addition, the agreements for these loans were concluded from fiscal 1982 to fiscal 1993. Of the ODA loans for Thailand during the period, the loan amount for the projects related to the Eastern Seaboard Development accounts for about 20 percent.

Meanwhile, JICA’s projects were involved in infrastructure development and JICA’s assistance was in the field of provision of construction of infrastructure. Furthermore, JICA also provided 12 packages of technical assistance and feasibility studies for the respective projects under the Eastern Seaboard Development Program (Söderberg, 1996: 101). However, from the early 1980s to the early 1990s, Japan placed an emphasis upon supporting the Eastern Seaboard Development Plan through JICA and OECF (Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund). Projects designed and planned during JICA’s development studies were largely realized with yen loans, and the cooperation program in the Eastern Seaboard region was held up as an example of a successful organic collaboration between technical cooperation and financial aid (JICA, 2000: 347). As for JICA’s technical assistance, in 1980s, JICA supported development studies; the preparation of feasibility study, master plan study, and detailed design study. Table 1 shows JICA’s projects relating technical cooperation in the following fields:
Table 1: JICA’s Projects relating to the Eastern Seaboard Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Type of Study Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Dok Krai-Map Ta Phut Water Pipeline Project in East Coast Area</td>
<td>D/D, 1981-1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Measures to Promote the Container Handling System through Leam Chabang Port</td>
<td>M/P, 1988-1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Development Plan Creation</td>
<td>1. Development Project of Leam Chabang Coastal Area</td>
<td>M/P, F/S, 1983-1984</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: M/P: Master Plan Study F/S: Feasibility Study D/D Detailed Design Study


At present, Rayon became industrialized with the highest per capita income in Thailand. On the one hand, the industrialization has an impact on Rayong’s environment. In March 2009, the Rayong Administrative Court ordered the National Environment Board to declare four areas as “pollution control zones”, comprising of Map Ta Phut Industrial Estate, Phuk Daeng Industries estate, Hemaraj Industrial Estate, and Asia Industrial Estate with 117 factories and hazardous waste management plants in operation. The aftermath of Japanese assistance to Rayong in a case of Map Ta Phut Industrial Estate shows us that JICA concentrated on economic performance with less consideration of environmental impacts. However, JICA’s activities in the last 5 years show activities in the environment field in order to build capacity of local governments or assist local organizations to solve the environmental problems. (See table 2)
Table 2: JICA’s technical assistance in field of environment in Rayong

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Projects</th>
<th>C/P agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>2006-2008</td>
<td>Development of environmental and emission standards of VOCs (Volatile Organic Compounds)</td>
<td>Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Promotion of formal collaboration among local governments in the three areas; infrastructure, disaster relief and waste management.</td>
<td>Pluak Daeng Municipality, Rayong Province, Thammasat University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Waste separation from the source and sustainable Development process of public participation in waste separation in Rayong Municipality</td>
<td>Development of Environment and Energy Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>The Third Country training Program on Control Strategy and Mitigation Measures of Acid Deposition</td>
<td>Ministry of Natural Resource and Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010-2014</td>
<td>The Development of Basic Schemes for Pollutant Release and Transfer Register System (PRTR) in the Kingdom of Thailand</td>
<td>Ministry of Natural Resource and Environment, Ministry of Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remark: Rayong is Pilot Project</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data gathered by the author

With regard to JICA’s activities as mentioned above, JICA assisted to solve air pollution caused by Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs). As Pollution Control Department (PCD) of Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment requested Japan technical cooperation to develop environmental and emission standards for VOCs, JICA dispatched preparatory mission and both parties agreed upon Minutes of Meeting and Record of Discussion in November, 2005. After the approval of the project, JICA implemented the project named "The Project for Development of Environmental and Emission Standards of VOCs in Kingdom of Thailand from 2006-2008. Since 2008, several sites for the continuous monitoring of VOCs were set up in Map Ta Phut district. In order to establish environmental and emission standards and develop measures against VOCs, JICA transferred technology through technical cooperation. Thai trainees can learn not only knowledge on VOCs, but also collection and analysis of VOCs, scientific approach to problems and information management.

Moreover, we can witness that in the last 5 years JICA has cooperated with other local governments and NGOs organizations. For example, in order to develop capacity of local government in the three areas; infrastructure, disaster relief and waste management, JICA worked with Pluak Daeng Municipality and Rayong Province in 2006. Another example is the project on "Solid Waste Management" which was the cooperated project between JICA and Rayong Municipality. Moreover, Ministry of Industry is cooperating with JICA in developing basic schemes for Pollutant Release and Transfer Register System (PRTR) between 2010-2014. In the future, JICA and Thailand will have more collaboration as the Thai government requested JICA to solve clay dune at the Map Ta Phut area.

JICA’s activities in the last 5 years show that these activities involved the environment field in order to assist local organizations to solve the environmental problems. In case of VOCs project, it implies that the government organizations do not have sufficient technology or resources to control environmental situation in the Map Ta Phut area. Consequently, The Thai government sought Japanese assistance for technology transfer. However, JICA visited the industrial estate in order to inquiry about the situation after the Supreme Administrative Court in December 2009 ordered to suspend 65 projects at the Map Ta Phut Industrial Estate. Furthermore, Yasunori Onishi, Chief Representative of JICA Thailand and staffs had a meeting with the Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning. On this occasion, JICA
expressed it is interested in exchange of experience and lessons learnt related to the pollution solution for the industrial estates, and the collaboration between communities and industrial sector, especially in the case of the Map Ta Phut Industrial Estate.

V. Conclusion

When Obuchi introduced the concept of human security, it was the response to the 1997 Asian financial crisis. In this respect, Japan attempted to become a leadership by increasing the political significance of its diplomacy in Asia through regional economic security. Regardless of, whether Japan’s leadership of promoting human security has been successful or not but the role of Obuchi in promoting human security was acknowledged and perceived by international community. In addition, the quest for UNSC seat and the image enhancement of Japanese ODA has been closely related to each other. The latter one could bring about the former one. Put it simply, Japan’s leadership of promoting human security has been successful or not but the role of Obuchi in promoting human security was acknowledged and perceived by international community - can pave the way to acquiring a permanent seat on UNSC. In doing so, Japan reconciles human security and Japanese ODA, and then utilizes JICA for implementing human security policies by enlarging the scope of security-related projects/activities into social dimensions. Despite the restriction of Article 9, Japan can step forward to the alternative movement of security and take more responsibilities in the areas of ‘global issues.’

Even though human security has not been discussed as a priority policy, it is still one of important missions of JICA. In such a way, if Japan should support for more bilateral assistance which meets partner countries’ needs. In addition, JICA should seek to further cooperation with various organizations including since human security has cross-sector characteristics by nature. However, due to its ambiguity and broad definition as well as its wide scope, practitioners might have difficulties in implementing activities or projects, in particular humanitarian intervention. Furthermore, Japan’s approach to human security concentrates on freedom from fear and freedom from want might be crucial if JICA’s contribution could make a balance between both of them.

However, in this paper, focusing on the role of JICA in assisting technical cooperation in Rayong, found that its technical activities and cooperation level and relationship with local governments has shifted. In terms of technical activities, in the past JICA provided technical cooperation for the provision of infrastructure development but at present it involves with technical cooperation in the environmental field. Nevertheless, capacity development is a critical tool for sustainable human development because it improves one’s capability in order to solve its own problem. That brings about human security at individual level and greatly influences sustainable development.

Note
1) Its definition of human security based on Diplomatic Bluebook 2003 is “a concept that focuses on the strengthening of human-centered efforts from the perspective of protecting the lives, livelihoods and dignity of individual human beings and realizing the abundant potential inherent in each individual.”
2) Features of the JICA Grassroots Partnership Program can be summarized as follows: 1) project proposals are submitted by NGOs, local governments, universities, and other organizations; 2) the project period is one year or less; 3) a project is implemented based on a contract between JICA and the organization. Personnel and administrative expenses and other costs, which have not been recognized in NGO grants, etc., can be included; and 4) since this program is implemented as a JICA program, JICA is in charge of project implementation and bears ultimate responsibility.

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